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Marx was the prophet, revolutionaries were the preachers, ideology was faith,
revolution was the Last Judgment. Yuri Slezkine’s interpretation of Bolshevism
as a millenarian sect in his monumental House of Government could be ren-
dered in both soft and hard versions. Both would start with the observation
that Bolshevik revolutionaries and religious sects displayed profound faith in
the coming of a newworld. In a less categorical version, Bolshevik collectivism
and the revolutionary trajectory would be analyzed anew in light of remark-
able parallels – and differences – with the history of those sectarianisms that
attempted to become established religions. The contours of such a “soft” anal-
ogy between religion and politics were described in Igal Halfin’s well-known
work on Soviet Marxist eschatology (remarkably, not cited by Slezkine): “Any
comparison I suggest between Christianity and Marxism serves an analytical,
not historical function. My reference to biblical terms throughout is no more
than a heuristic device intended to evoke the deep plot of the eschatological
master narrative.”1
1 IgalHalfin, FromDarkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, andSalvation inRevolutionaryRussia
(Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2000), 42.
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Slezkine’smillenary epic (actually 1,104 pages) is inundatedwith biblical ter-
minology for a more far-reaching, “harder” aim: to establish that Bolshevism
was quite literally anothermillenarian sect in a line fromZoroaster, early Chris-
tians, Muslims, Münster Anabaptists, Jacobins, Mormons, Melanesian Cargo
cults, and others (180). Chapter titles and references to the Flood, the Last Judg-
ment, the Valley of the Dead, etc. are a rather heavy-handed stylistic device to
argue by force of repetition. A soft claim would make the remarkable literary
proliferation of religious imagery and biblical analogies among Bolshevik intel-
lectuals into a problem for analysis; the hard version cites it on every possible
occasion as proof. As for the Bolsheviks’ most relevant French revolutionary
precursors, they remain but an entry in the list; other revolutions with their
earlymodern religious-constitutional balance starting with Hus and the Dutch
Revolt are not part of the analytical mix. The (secular) adaptation of very old
religious concepts such as “new man” or “soul” in Bolshevik ideology and dis-
course is not a concern; nor is the actual historical traffic among sects, religion,
and revolutionaries in pre-revolutionary Russia, whichwas substantial. Rather,
for most of the book Slezkine hews to a hard version of his sectarian thesis:
Christian original sin and religious heresy (“thought crimes”) were part of an
original, religious totalitarianism. All millenarianisms, Bolshevism included,
were the “vengeful fantasy of the dispossessed” (99, 957). Bolshevism’s nature
as an apocalyptic sect, embedded within the history of all the others, explains
the course of the Bolshevik Revolution and, by extension, the life of the Soviet
Union.
The notion that communismwas religious in nature goes back to such inter-
war writers as René Fülöp-Miller and Nikolai Berdiaev. The great intellectual
historian Andrzej Walicki discussed how “totalitarian ideology is not merely
a secularized religion; it is a secularized form of chiliastic religiosity.” The great
Sovietologist Robert C.Tucker called thenotion of a total regeneration of man a
secular version of Christian salvation, dubbed Bolshevism amillenarianmove-
ment, and pointed out the growing resemblance of the party-state to a “church-
state.”2 More recently, a large new literature on political religions and totalitar-
ianism has been incisively critiqued, notably by Erik van Ree, discussed below.
It is shocking how few of the most relevant works are included in Slezkine’s
partial accounting (998 n. 1), and none are seriously engaged.
But Slezkine’s mission is hardly historiographical, and his work in this con-
text is novel in several ways. In general, previous treatments focus on mature
Stalinism as a political religion, look in particular to the legacy of Orthodoxy,
2 For full references to all these works and others, see Michael David-Fox, “Opiate of the
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and examine the structures of the “church-state” rather than the mentality,
outlook, and faith of revolutionary believers. Slezkine keeps his considerable
analytical firepower trained on the history of sectarian millenarianism. His
book’s unprecedented illumination of the personal and intimate lives of Old
Bolshevik revolutionaries, traced through the prism of a fascinating swathe
of Old Bolshevik elites living in the Dom pravitel’stva across from the Krem-
lin, aims at grasping the course of Bolshevik “sectarianism” on both sides of
1917. Chapters on the revolutionaries’ youth and education at the start, and
the Old Bolsheviks’ relationship with their children and the decimation of
the House of Government elites in Stalin’s Terror at the end, are among the
most powerful. At its empirical core, this is a tale of two generations whose
entire trajectory from the end of Civil War on appears as an extended cri-
sis in an ultimately failed attempt fully to institutionalize and perpetuate the
faith.
Was the Marxist faith of the Bolshevik revolutionaries a religion? Slezkine
starts his deliberately elliptical third chapter dealing with conceptual ques-
tions, “The Faith,” with the statement: “the most sensible answer is that it does
not matter” (73). It does not matter because any definition revolving around
the “content” of religion as supernatural or transcendental is untenable: “Just
how empirical or non-transcendental are humanism, Hindutva, manifest des-
tiny, and the kingdom of freedom?” (74). Slezkine then appears to tilt toward
Durkheimian functionalism, instructing how religion can be defined in terms
of how the sacred unites people intomoral communities. He doubles down on
the impossibility of separating secular from religious: “Whatever one’s under-
standingof the ‘sacred’… it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that every
society is by definition religious, that any comprehensive ideology (including
secularism) creates and reflects amoral community…” (75). Having thus strate-
gically muddied the waters, Slezkine proceeds in the next thousand pages to
alignBolshevismand the Soviet statenotwithother ideologies, societies, states,
revolutions, or subcultures, but to analyze them in light of a structural identifi-
cation with millenarian religious sects throughout the ages. The most sensible
answer to the question of whether Bolshevism was a religion, in light of that
basic move, is that it does matter.
A conventional academicmonographwould strive to lay out its thesis in the
introduction as clearly as possible, given the usually severe space constraints.
Intellectuals? Pilgrims, Partisans, and Political Tourists,”Kritika 12, 3 (Summer 2011): 723–
724, and David-Fox, “Religion, Science, and Political Religion in the Soviet Context,”Modern
Intellectual History 8, 2 (2011): 471–484.
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Editors of trade books, by contrast, forbid “signposting.”3 Slezkinemodifies and
more fully explains his position only in Chapter 33, “The End,” where at long
last he pivots away from lumping and embraces splitting: “Why did Bolshevism
die after one generation, like sects that have never become successfully institu-
tionalized (let alone conquered much of the world)?” (951). Having apparently
argued in Chapter 3 that it is impossible to define the supernatural (or perhaps
he was only implying that the difficulty in doing so makes it irrelevant to ask
whether Marxism was a religion?), he now declares 30 chapters later that the
“core” of the Marxist vision of history was supernatural. The massive literature
on the history of Marxism suggests how the tension between determinism and
voluntarism played itself out differently in a panoply of Marxist movements,
but Slezkine hews to a narrowly religious interpretation of Marx and Marx-
ism. The coming of communism is supernatural because it is “preordained
and independent of human will” (951). (Let us leave aside that independent
of human will does not necessarily imply supernatural or transcendent, that is
outside the natural world in time and space; “scientific socialism” is naturalis-
tic in that communism will come about as a consequence of historical laws
independent of human will. This is naturalistic determinism). Yet, Slezkine
continues, wrapped around that supernatural, religious core was a sociologi-
cal and economic vocabulary with “no overt references to magic, mystery, or
transcendence.” Wrapping rationality around a religious core gave Marxism a
“rigidity” that “explicitly irrational prophecies do not have” (952).
Religious faith cannot be empirically disproved, but the allegedly scientific
laws of history can. All this suggests to me that Slezkine, despite blurring
distinctions in his lumping phase, ultimately cannot dispense with the notion
that religion has a “supernatural” or transcendent content, nor can he avoid
contrasting religious and secular or making distinctions based on rationalism.
To be sure, there are plenty of clues along theway that this sect was different
from all other sects. Early on, Slezkine points out that in Russia a “conversion
to socialism was a conversion to the intelligentsia, a fusion of millenarian faith
and lifelong learning.” The intelligentsia proponents of socialism differed from
their Christian analogues by their “intellectualism” (36–37). In other words,
science and scientism mattered. While the “scientific” non-core of Bolshevik
ideology and the intertwined history of science and political radicalism in Rus-
sia and the ussr is hardly touched upon, The House of Government features a
predominant literary uklon. TheOld Bolsheviks’ devotion to the classics of Rus-
3 Interview with Nancy Toff, Oxford University Press, American Historical Association confer-
ence, Washington, dc, 5 January 2018.
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sian and European (mostly French, German, and English) literature is passed
down to the generation of the “children” largely without its accompaniment
of Marxian economics and sociology. Despite that thesis, the intelligentsia’s
obsession with “Russia and theWest,” the European emigration of the Old Bol-
sheviks, and thewhole traditionof “RussianEuropeans” andmodernizers never
enters in on the level of analysis. It would be as if, say, theMormon elders spent
much of their lives in debates about Smith, Kant, and Flaubert.
By “The End,”we learn that the content of the non-supernatural periphery of
the faith was in fact crucial: “Focused on political economy and ‘base’ derived
sociology, Marxism developed a remarkably flat conception of human nature.”
When theOld Bolsheviks’ had their children readTolstoy but not the classics of
Marxism-Leninism, they were “digging the grave of their revolution.” Everyday
human morality and new ways of monitoring the family, as in the great reli-
gions, were bypassed by the Bolshevik preoccupationwith state property rights
and the economic base: “The house of socialism – as a residential buildingwith
family apartments – was a contradiction in terms” (952–953). Up until now,
leaving out the modern state as an analytical factor has also meant omitting
the many ways Bolshevik revolutionaries deliberately or otherwise perpetu-
ated lines of continuitywith imperial Russia. InChapter 33, for perhaps the first
time, causal weight in the overall argument is given to the legacy of the Russian
empire. Having come out swinging with an uncompromisingly hard version
of the sectarian thesis, Slezkine at the end pragmatically pulls back toward a
“softer” version. But these modifications come too little, too late.
If the state is one missing pillar in Slezkine’s interpretive framework, the
other is modernity. Soviet modernity is not important to the discussion, and
the author merely notes that “becoming modern meant internalizing a new
regimen of neatness, cleanliness, propriety, sobriety, punctuality, and ratio-
nality” (276). This is similar to the definition in The Jewish Century – except
that there, since the goal was to suggest how the Jews were the quintessen-
tial moderns, the state had to be brought in: “Modern states are as keen on the
symmetry, transparency, spotlessness, and boundedness of the body politic as
traditional Jews and Gypsies are on the ritual purity and autonomy of their
communities.”4 The current work, by contrast, is geared around proving the
ancient, enduring sectarian patterns governing the Bolshevik faith. Left out
from Slezkine’s invocation of modernity, most notably, are changing concep-
tions of time and space, state interventionism, the rise of the social, and the
4 Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 30, quotation
45.
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entire phenomenon of statism and dirigisme so central in Bolshevik ideol-
ogy and Soviet practices. Bolshevik violence and early Soviet utopianism were
stamped indelibly with a cult of utilitarian rationality, quanto-mania, and the
machine age. While the sectarian thesis has the advantage of taking faith seri-
ously (and, by extension, ideology, since belief can be seen as one of ideology’s
many faces), it omits the central fact that Lenin’s and Stalin’s Marxism were
both geared around capturing the state and radically upgrading its capacity.
Those two residents of the Kremlin are mentioned a lot but as politicians and
ideologues the two leaders are not really explicated in terms of the work’s sec-
tarian theme.
Compartmentalizing modernity as the internalization of discipline means
that the distinction between the premodern and the modern hardly comes
into play when folding the Soviet “superstate” (Moshe Lewin) into a contin-
uous single stream stretching back to ancient sects. The fact that a range of
non-millenarian revolutions played out with patterns in important ways com-
parable to the Russian Revolution is also unexplained. Maybe there is no such
thing as a non-millenarian revolution, or perhaps the crux of the sectarian
thesis, the expectation of the imminent apocalypse, is subject to a certain con-
ceptual inflation: “All revolutions are ‘revolutions of the saints’ insofar as they
are serious about ‘insatiable utopias’ ” (122).
At the same time, Slezkine archaizes the concept of totalitarianism, com-
monly seen as a modern if not twentieth-century phenomenon. “Christianity,”
he declares, “is inherently ‘totalitarian’ in the sense of demanding an uncon-
ditional moral submission … and emphasizing thought crimes over formal
legality …” (106). For the rest of the book, the quotation marks around totali-
tarianism when applied to religion are removed. Observing that “Marx-Engels-
Lenin-Stalin … left their disciples no guidance on how to be good Communists
at home,” the book’s conclusions feature a bit of typical Slezkinian épatage: “the
problem with Bolshevism was that it was not totalitarian enough” (953). Even
the Grand Inquisitor, if he could look forward to the Soviet state machine and
the gulag, might find that this formulation misses the point. That said, how-
ever, one of the work’s most meaningful insights is that the protracted, agoniz-
ing process of institutionalizing the faith after the revolution is an important,
revealing lens for viewing the 1920s and 1930s together.
In the famous 1949 compilation The God that Failed, Arthur Koestler also
argued that there is no difference between traditional religion and revolution-
ary faith.When he joined the Communist Party of Germany at age 26, Koestler
much later confessed, he suffered from the “neurotic maladjustment” of the
zealot. He claimed his commitment, like that of all true believers, was irra-
tional: “A faith is not acquired by reasoning. One does not fall in love with a
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woman, or enter the womb of a church, as a result of logical persuasion.”5 The
House of Government is not shy about political commentary. It makes some
sharp forays into u.s. politics and society, for example describing the bizarre
American ritual abuse panic in hundreds of u.s. childcare centers in the 1980s
just before turning to the witch hunts of the Stalinist Terror. However uncon-
ventional, I found that to be an effective device to provoke thought about
Stalinist uniqueness (705–710). But in the course of the entire tome, Slezkine
never sees fit to mention how the communism-as-religion argument became
caught up in Cold War, anti-communist politics in the u.s. and other western
countries. By the same token, the revival and development of the political reli-
gion concept in the 1990s went hand in hand with a return to the concept of
totalitarianism; the journal Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions was
launched around the turn of the millenium. For Koestler, identifying revolu-
tionary belief as irrational religion served to explain away his own past actions,
thus obscuring agency and his own motivations. For the field of Soviet his-
tory, totalitarianism flattened or obscured the explication of causality, either by
inflating an all-encompassing ideology into the sole cause of causes or reduc-
ing differing explanatory dimensions – and messy reality – to the inexorable
development of a mono-causal “seed.”
By distinguishing among the divine, the sacred, and the heroic, Erik van Ree
provides the critique of the political religion literature that is alsomost relevant
for Slezkine’s full identification between sectarian religion and Bolshevik ideo-
logical belief. “Does heroic utopianism,” asks van Ree, “depend on the impulses
of faith and hope, much like religions do? In some fundamental respects: yes.
TheMarxist project of theKingdomof Labour is only slightly less fantastic than
its Christian counterpart of the Kingdom of God.” But that, van Ree argues, is
not the whole story. He goes on to characterize the Soviet order as a “faith-
evidence hybrid”:
Whereas the communist utopian goal was a faith-driven fantasy, the pro-
cess of constructing the new order was not. The new society was being
built in the real world, with human hands, and there was nothing oth-
erworldly about these constructive efforts. Heroic belief systems cannot
survive on a diet of faith alone. Evidence-based knowledge, science, must
be brought into the equation in large doses. The very survival of the rev-
olutionary state depends on it … Heroic utopianism can be regarded as
5 ArthurKoestler, inTheGod that Failed, ed. RichardCrossman (NewYork:Harper andBrothers,
1949): 15, 17.
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a vast project of social engineering. ‘Scientific’ theory was tied in the
straightjacket of an activist agenda. Stalin always emphasised that theory
did not exist for its own sake, but for practical purposes. In his favourite
expression, it was ‘no dogma but a guide to action.’6
Millenarian religious communities also needed to survive in the real world
and they have also seized power. But by making the rationalist, modernist,
scientistic, secular bulk of the Bolsheviks’ ideology peripheral, how can we
really explain the economic, social, political and cultural transformations that
ensued? Slezkine’s description of a religious core surrounded by a rationalist
ideology and van Ree’s notion of a faith-evidence hybrid hold differing impli-
cations for understanding Soviet history. By definition, a core is central, and
according it such primacy engages a reductionist reasoning: to establish the
millenarian nature of the sect’s religious core is to explain the dynamics of the
Soviet trajectory. To consider a hybrid, by contrast, is to give causal weight to
multiple vectors of historical analysis.
In its monocausal maximalism and mammoth form, The House of Govern-
ment was shaped, I would submit, by its contribution to a relatively new and
developing genre. I call it the academic blockbuster. The film analogy suggested
itself when I saw the book’s Princeton University Press trailer – so it is labeled
on the site – set to the haunting soundtrack from “Burnt by the Sun.” At a
timewhenmanyacademicpresses are struggling, Princeton competes for those
“top-tier books that that not only shape their fields but often spark interest out-
side academia.” Blockbusters are the top tier of what is called in the publishing
business by such names as “impact academic” or “ac-trade” books. In 2015, the
last year for which figures are available, Princeton Press boasted total revenue
of more than$23million andnet assets of about $138million.As outgoingpress
director Peter J. Dougherty said in a recent interview: “I don’t think of them as
Princeton books if they’re not books that teach the teachers and raise the big
issues and consolidate the conversations …These are field-defining books.”7 In
the historical discipline, the rhetoric of paradigm shifts and game-changers,
which “not only” redefine entire fields, favors the most audacious arguments
with world-historical sweep, preferably ones that present the keys to big fea-
tures of the human condition. At the same time, the immediate historical topic
6 Erik van Ree, “Stalinist Ritual and Belief System: Reflections on ‘Political Religion,’ ” Politics,
Religion and Ideology, 17: 2–3 (2016): 143–161, quotations 152–153, available at: http://www
.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21567689.2016.1187600.
7 Jennifer Howard, “The Character of its Content: How Princeton University Press has Thrived
in a New Publishing Landscape,”Princeton AlumniWeekly, 6 December 2017, 34–38.
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at hand must be gripping to a wide audience, hence it is most often biographi-
cal or personal in nature.What the alluring combination of those two disparate
registers largely leaves out is the crucial, scholarly, meso-level scale of analy-
sis.
The generic factors helping to shape what is most valued at the pinnacle
of academic publishing should provoke some introspection among historians
about both their positive and negative implications. It was not so long ago that
senior scholars at the peak of their powers would either write more influential
academic studies or perhaps turn to general histories and textbooks; popular-
izations in many fields such as u.s. history, which played a large role in the
advent of the blockbuster,were oftenpennedbymediocrehacks. As a crossover
work, the blockbuster must impress specialists and appeal to the public. It is
far from the worst development that our most talented historians are making
far-reaching arguments that attract a broader audience, while at the same time
they are rewarded for their achievements in scholarship. Is it surprising that the
most talented academic historians today turn to blockbusters, which univer-
sities now also seem to value more than conventional scholarship? Slezkine’s
book, no matter how different in content from Princeton historian Stephen
Kotkin’s first volume of his Stalin biography, displays some structural similari-
ties.8 Kotkin’s work is three books in one, reaching with breathtaking boldness
to narrate both global and Russian history around and through the imme-
diate topic at hand, the biography of Stalin; Slezkine’s triad is comprised by
humankind’s experiencewithmillenarianism and religion, the entire history of
the Russian Revolution, and the subject of the book, the House of Government
(built in 1929). Both really focus in on their central topics only about halfway
through massive tomes.
Some academic cultures, such as the German, traditionally favor an exhaus-
tive accounting of existing scholarship in order to demonstrate that it has been
assimilated and is being built upon; the u.s. historical community has tradi-
tionally favored a strong dose of originality. But most blockbusters including
this one, hewing to trade press conventions, go further to eschew historiogra-
phy, definitions, technical analysis of sources, and careful and consistent expo-
sition of the argument – all features of conventional scholarship that scholars
but not others find valuable or interesting.
The monstrous length of the blockbuster involves a certain paradox: as
conventional academic studies involving years of research must be cut shorter
and shorter, it is de rigeur that blockbusters on such topics as the revolution,
8 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin, 1: Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 (New York: Penguin, 2014).
84 review essay/article de synthèse
Canadian-American Slavic Studies 52 (2018) 75–86
Stalin, andwarmust be physically imposing. Is this because these doorstoppers
will be displayed on coffee tables and not fully read by that vital educated
public? The House of Government would have actually been more effective
shorn of several hundred pages. Its size is extended largely through biographies
and descriptions of literary plots, which are marked by dazzling bursts of
stylistic brilliance but not infrequently by a lack of sharp or consistent analysis.
The listing and chronicling that are far from absent here diminish the book’s
appeal even as the blockbuster by definition is designed to appeal to greater
numbers. Doggedly reading two chapters a day every day for a peripatetic three
weeks, I actually suffered a lower back injury frommy backpack’s extra weight.
As a physical artifact, the book was not up to the task: its binding broke 900
pages in.
A successful academic blockbuster must also impress the academics. Many
attempts do not, and their effect on a field turns out to be similar to a flash in
the pan. In this department, however, Slezkine succeeds to the point where his
workmight even be seen as a very positive innovation for the genre. The depth
of the knowledge and material he acquired about the building – including its
construction, its apartments, their residents, family lives, personalities, mate-
rial culture, friendships, and generational relations – was culled from many
years of research in a wide array of archives that included private collections
and, notably, the archive of the “Museum of the House on the Embankment”
itself. Thismakes the work of lasting importance for scholars in the field. Much
of the personal correspondence Slezkine brings to bear is not only unforget-
table as biographical history, but unusually revealing because it displays the
writers’ belief systems not in doctrinal tracts but as they were intertwinedwith
the passions and tragedies of everyday life.
To give just one example how biographical depth can impart exceptional
insight into sources, the book contains an unforgettable sequence involving
the letters of Tania Miagkova, wife of Ukrainian finance official Mikhail Poloz
(apartment 199), arrested with former Trotskyists in January 1933. Miagkova’s
prison correspondence to her party-minded mother and soon-to-be-arrested
husband intertwines news about her intense prison study program, her phys-
ical tribulations, her ever-more precarious family relations, and her attempts
at political-ideological rehabilitation. Slezkine suggests how the censors also
formed part of her audience: “The Bolsheviks – like most priests, historians,
and the participants of the [House of Government] State New Theater’s pro-
duction of The Other Side of the Heart – had no clear doctrine on how to judge
the sincerity of contribution. It was – and is – impossible to be sure on what
occasions Tania resorted tomentalis restrictio, but it does appear likely that, for
themost part, she tried her best to erase the distinction between her yearnings
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on the one hand and her mother’s Party-minded expectations, her daughter’s
happy-childhoodentitlements, andher censors’ inscrutableways, on theother”
(576).
On the other hand, the blockbuster genremostly excludes the technicalities
of sustained questioning of sources, which means untold numbers of the ego-
documents brought to bear. In conventional academic histories, the historian
usually doesnot go so far as todiscuss explicitly howsources andknowledge are
acquired. But sustained source criticism serves as a reminder that there always
lies a space of uncertainty between the author and his conclusions. At a few
points, Slezkine pauses to note the most obvious biases in his sources, as in
the case of hagiographicmemoirs or interrogation records, but since Bolshevik
myth-making or the conventions of the Stalin cult suit the sectarian thesis
he goes on to use them anyway. This becomes most problematic in the early
sections of thework, whenmemoirs providematerial for narrating the broader
history of the Revolution and Civil War.
Source criticism forms one part of a broader issue, reflexivity and the role
of the author in the narrative. Slezkine brings an anthropological eye to bear
on observations about such issues as the workings of household economies,
relations between Bolsheviks of intelligentsia and plebeian origins, House res-
idents and the Boloto neighborhood surrounding it, peasant maids and house-
hold economies, furniture and space. The author’s previous work on the far
North, nationalities policy, and Judaism benefitted much from engaging an-
thropology. But in one respect the current work is very un-anthropological. Not
only does the author tell no arrival story; the narrative strives for literaturnost’
with the reflexivity left out. Slezkine decided not to reflect on how his own
involvement in the topic affected his “fieldwork.” Instead, the reader is placed
fully in the hands of an omniscient, supremely confident narrator who appears
to know his subjects better than they knew themselves. The main thrust of
that narration, of course, continually posits the Bolshevik atheists’ false con-
sciousness. The text’s tone toward its Bolshevik subjects is ironical, detached,
at times witty, at times sharply mocking; the irony recedes a bit when tragedy
strikes. Kate Brown, more than any other Soviet historian, has pushed against
just this kind of remote, seemingly uninvolved academic narrator and pressed
for the advantages of acknowledging the narrator’s presence in the story.9Why
should authorial reflexivity not match well with the needs of the academic
blockbuster? It took ananthropologist, SergeiOushakine, to invite Slezkine and
9 Kate Brown, Dispatches from Dystopia: Histories of the Places Not Yet Forgotten (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2015).
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other historians of theRussianRevolutionpublicly to relate their arrival stories.
Straining to understand Slezkine’s grainy-sounding podcast, wemust conclude
that authorial relexivity hardly seems irrelevant – from the formative influence
on the author of his disillusioned Bolshevik grandmother, to his early and com-
plete lack of exposure to religion, to his longstanding interest in finding the
“broken link” between his grandparents’ ideals and his own generation.10
In the marvelous concluding sections on the generation of the “children”
and the epilogue on Iurii Trifonov, who wrote about the House in his novels,
Slezkine argues that the Bolshevik project foundered on the family in two
ways. The parents never passed down the study of Marxism-Leninism, and they
were formed above all by the realist novel and such contemporary historical
fiction as Rolland and Feuchtwanger – which added up to “antimillenarian
humanism” (954). The parents “lived for the future; their children lived in the
past” (955). Second, the “Bolsheviks never worried very much about the family,
never policed the home, and never connected the domestic rites of passage –
childbirth, marriage, and death – to their sociology and political economy”
(952).While the sectarian thesis may be one-sided, scholars will bemining this
book’s unprecedentedly richmaterials on revolutionary lives for years to come.
In addition, the book’s generational theme, its arguments about the family, and
especially its treatment of the generation of the children offer new ways to
bridge what is now the Soviet field’s most important divide: between the study
of the interwar decades and the emergent field of postwar history.11
10 Yuri Slezkine, “The Russian Revolution: A Personal Journey,” lecture delivered at Prince-
ton University, 28 September 2017, https://october1917-2017.princeton.edu/podcasts/, last
accessed 2 January 2018.
11 This publicationwas preparedwithin the framework of the Basic Research Program at the
NationalResearchUniversityHigher School of Economics (hse) and supportedwithin the
framework of a subsidy by the Russian Academic Excellence Project ‘5–100.’ It waswritten
when the author was a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies.
